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IMPUTING THE WEALTH MAXIMIZATION PRINCIPLE TO
STATE LEGISLATORS
Judge Richard A. Posner, of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, is the most prominent and controversial figure in the
field of law-and-economics.1 Law-and-economics is a body of thought
that applies the principles of economics to the analysis of legal problems.
As a scholar, Judge Posner's major contributions to the field have been
his concept of efficiency as wealth maximization,2 his theory of the com-
mon law as a system of efficiency-promoting--or wealth-maximizing-
legal rules,3 and his advocacy of wealth maximization as the appropriate
criterion of social choice and judicial decision-making. 4 His views have
generated a host of commentary and criticism.5 Since his appointment to
the bench in 1981, Judge Posner has had the opportunity to apply his
theories in judicial opinions. Not surprisingly, this application has also
begun to generate commentary. 6
In Judge Posner's view, economic analysis can be applied to a vast
range of legal problems. In his book, Economic Analysis of Law, 7 Judge
Posner discussed the application of economics to virtually every substan-
tive area of law. In addition, Judge Posner has used economic concepts
to study the federal court system,8 to explain the concept of justice, 9 to
develop theories of procedure1 ° and to suggest an approach to constitu-
1. For a brief history of the law-and-economics movement, see Posner, Some Uses and Abuses
of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 281-84 (1979).
2. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-15 (3d. ed. 1986).
3. For Judge Posner's economic analysis of the common law, see id. at 28-246.
4. See Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
131 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Kronman, Wealth
Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980); West, Authority, Autonomy,
and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A
Critical Review of Richard Posner's The Economics of Justice (Book Review), 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105
(1982); Jay, The World According to Judge Posner (Book Review), 73 GEO. L.J. 1507 (1985); Samu-
els, Maximization of Wealth as Justice: An Essay on Posnerian Law and Economics as Policy Analysis
(Book Review), 60 TEX. L. REV. 147 (1981).
6. See Samuels & Mercuro, Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench, 4 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 107 (1984); Samuels & Mercuro, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making: The
Issues Further Clarified, 6 INrT'L REV. L. & EON. 133 (1986); Comment, Posnerian Jurisprudence
and Economic Analysis of Law: The View from the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (1985).
7. R. POSNER, supra note 2.
8. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
9. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
10. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 517; Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure
and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). See also Comment, supra note 6, at
1127.
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tional and statutory interpretation.II
This article will focus on Judge Posner's application of economic
analysis to the interpretation of state statutes-an area that raises not
only questions concerning the feasibility of using economics as a means
of ascertaining legislative intent, but also questions concerning the judi-
cial role and the very validity of using efficiency analysis to interpret stat-
utes when, as Judge Posner recognizes, legislation is often based on goals
other than economic efficiency. As will be seen, these questions take on
additional significance in the context of federal diversity jurisdiction,
where the role of a federal judge is to interpret state law as would the
state's highest court. The article will demonstrate that by using eco-
nomic analysis in interpreting state statutes, Judge Posner imputes to the
legislature efficiency concerns that are not supported by the language of
the statute, the available legislative history or, in one case, statements of
the state supreme court. The article concludes that the use of economic
analysis in statutory interpretation involves unacceptable speculation
and, more importantly, is violative of the judicial role and potentially
violative of federalism concerns.
Part I will briefly describe the principles of economic analysis of law
and Judge Posner's scholarly views on statutory interpretation. Part II
will outline three opinions written by Judge Posner involving the inter-
pretation of state statutes and will discuss the economic considerations
expressed or implied by the opinions. Part III will critically examine the
approach taken in each case and will comment upon the legal and eco-
nomic reasoning employed and the appropriateness of Judge Posner's
approach.
I. JUDGE POSNER'S ECONOMIC VIEW 12
A. Wealth Maximization as a Concept of Efficiency
The foundation of Judge Posner's economic analysis of law is neo-
classical price theory, or microeconomics, 13 which is the study of individ-
ual consumer and producer behavior and how that behavior determines
price in a competitive market.' 4 The theory proceeds from two basic
11. See R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 261; Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Stat-
utes and the Constitution, 49 U. Cii. L. REV. 263 (1982); Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 800 (1983).
12. The elements of Judge Posner's economic analysis are clearly articulated in George Cohen's
Comment, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View from the Bench, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (1985). This section of the article draws heavily from that work as well as from
Judge Posner's writings.
13. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at xx; Comment, supra note 12, at 1118.
14. Macroeconomics, on the other hand, is the study of the aggregate effects of supply and
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assumptions: 1) that resources are scarce in relation to human wants;, 5
and 2) that people act rationally to maximize their individual satisfac-
tions or, in economic terms, their personal "utility. 1 6 From these two
basic assumptions are derived two principles of economics: the law of
supply and demand17 and the concept of efficiency.
The concept of efficiency describes an economically desirable alloca-
tion of resources in society. While theorists have defined efficiency in
various ways,'8 Judge Posner defines efficiency as that allocation of re-
sources in which their value is highest so that the aggregate wealth of
society is maximized.19 He defines the value of a resource as the maxi-
mum amount one is willing and able to pay for it or the minimum
amount one would accept to part with it.2° A transaction is considered
efficient if it results in shifting resources to higher-valued uses.
21
Because people are assumed to be rational self-interest maximizers,
voluntary transactions are presumed to be efficient-i.e., voluntary trans-
demand on the economy as a whole and focuses on such problems as unemployment and inflation.
See, e.g., W. PETERSON, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: MICRO 1 (4th ed. 1980) (distinguishing be-
tween "micro" and "macro" economics); Comment, supra note 12, at 1118 n.5.
15. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1119. Resources, in economic terms, are not limited to
monetary or physical resources, but include intangible resources such as time. Id. at n.6.
16. The term "utility" can have several meanings. Consumers make choices to maximize util-
ity, defined philosophically as happiness, pleasure and satisfactions, or defined economically as ex-
pected value or benefit. In the case of producers, one usually speaks of maximizing profits rather
than utility. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 5, 11; Comment, supra note 12, at 1119.
17. The law of supply and demand expresses the relationships between price charged and quan-
tity demanded and between price and output. A rational self-interested consumer faced with rising
prices for particular goods will consider substituting other lower priced goods. Thus, the demand
for the higher priced goods decreases. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 4-5. A rational profit-
maximizing producer will expand output so long as the additional revenue gained by producing one
more unit of output (called "marginal revenue") is greater than the additional costs incurred (called
"marginal costs"). Id. at 249-51. A market is said to be in "equilibrium" when the conditions of
supply and demand are such that there is no incentive for sellers to alter price or output. Id. at 8.
18. One definition is "Pareto efficiency." A Pareto efficient state is one in which there is a
"socially optimal allocation" of resources. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1120. A "socially opti-
mal allocation" of resources exists when no person can better his position without making someone
else worse off. Id. Focusing upon individual transactions, a transaction is said to be Pareto superior
if at least one person is made better off and no person is made worse off. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at
12.
Pareto efficiency is an austere concept. For example, a two person society in which one person
had all the resources would be considered Pareto efficient since a change in resource allocation
would make the advantaged person worse off. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1120.
Because transactions in the real world are rarely Pareto superior, a less austere concept of
efficiency is provided by the Kaldor-Hicks model. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 12. Under this
concept, sometimes called the "compensation criterion," an activity is considered efficient if the
benefits to be gained outweigh the costs, so that the winners could potentially compensate the losers.
See Comment, supra note 12, at 1124. Whether the winners do, in fact, compensate the losers does
not affect the determination of whether the activity is efficient. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 13.
19. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 12.
20. Id. at 11.
21. Id. at 9.
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actions will not occur unless both parties expect to maximize their inter-
ests.22 Thus, through the process of voluntary exchange, resources are
shifted to higher-valued uses, and aggregate social wealth is maximized. 23
A major question in Judge Posner's efficiency analysis is whether
and under what circumstances an involuntary exchange will be efficient.
The concept of efficiency-under any theory- is based upon the ideal
of voluntary exchange-i.e., a market. A "market failure" is said to oc-
cur where transaction costs, information costs or other obstacles to free
trade make voluntary exchange infeasible.24 In such cases, the legal sys-
tem may step in to correct a market failure. 25 In determining whether a
legal rule which effects or approves an involuntary transfer is efficient,
Judge Posner applies a hypothetical-market analysis. The analysis asks
whether, if voluntary exchange had been feasible, it would have oc-
curred.26 A legal rule is considered efficient or efficiency-promoting if it
effects or induces the same wealth maximizing allocation of resources as
would the hypothetical market.
27
B. Wealth Maximization as a Principle of Justice
Judge Posner believes that, in large part, the law (particularly judge-
made law) has been and should be guided by the goal of maximizing
wealth. The first part of this belief-that the law has been guided by the
principle of wealth maximization-is the major conclusion of Judge Pos-
ner's positive economic analysis of the common law. 28 He views the
22. Id. at 13.
23. For example, assume A owns a book which he values at $5 (the minimum amount he would
accept to part with it). B values the book at $10 (the maximum amount he is willing to pay for it).
Since A and B are assumed to be rational self-interest maximizers, a sale of the book is likely to
occur, provided that voluntary exchange-a market-is permitted. A sale at a price of, say, $7 will
produce the following results: 1) the book has gravitated to a higher valued use (from $5 to $10) so
that the wealth of society has increased by $5; 2) A has increased his wealth by $2 (received $7 for a
book worth only $5 to him); and 3) B has increased his wealth by $3 (since he spent only $7 to
acquire a book worth $10 to him). The sale was efficient because it maximized aggregate social
wealth. In this example, it also increased each individual's wealth, but that is not part of Judge
Posner's definition of efficiency, which focuses solely on aggregate social wealth.
Note that Judge Posner does not use the term "wealth" in an accounting sense. According to
Judge Posner, wealth "is measured by what people would pay for things (or demand in exchange for
giving up things they possess), not by what they do pay for them. Thus leisure has value, and is a
part of wealth, even though it is not bought and sold." R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 15.
24. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1120-21. Transaction costs include, among other things,
the costs of finding trading partners, conducting negotiations, and obtaining information relevant to
the transaction.
25. Judge Posner qualifies the idea of market failures, stating that the "failure is ordinarily a
failure of the market and of the rules of the market prescribed by the common law." R. POSNER,
supra note 2, at 343 (emphasis in original).
26. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 14; R. POSNER, supra note 9, at 61-62.
27. For an example of Judge Posner's hypothetical-market analysis, see infra note 29.
28. Judge Posner has described positive economic analysis of law as "the use of economic anal-
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common law as a coherent system of legal rules and doctrines which can
best be explained as a system for maximizing wealth in society.
29
The second part of Judge Posner's belief-that the law should be
guided by a goal of maximizing wealth-is the normative side of eco-
nomic analysis of law.30 This belief is primarily based upon two ideas:
1) that wealth maximization is an important value in society;3' and
2) that it is the only social value that courts can do much to promote.
32
Concerning the first idea, Judge Posner has written that wealth "is
conducive to happiness, freedom, self-expression, and other uncontrover-
sial goods."' 33 As such, he notes that "conventional wisdom" holds that
wealth is a value.34 However, the wealth that is valued by Judge Posner
is aggregate social wealth rather than each individual's personal wealth.
In Judge Posner's words, " '[w]ealth maximization' as a guide to govern-
ysis to explain what is or has been or to predict what will be." Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of
Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 285 (1979). Normative economic analysis of law, on the
other hand, is "the use of economic analysis to argue for what should be." Id.
29. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 229-44. Judge Posner states that common law doctrines
"form a system for inducing people to behave efficiently." Id. at 229. For example, applying a
hypothetical-market analysis, Judge Posner concludes that the Learned Hand negligence formula
(articulated in United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)) is an efficiency-
promoting legal rule. Under the Hand formula, an injurer is negligent if the cost of precaution (B) is
less than the gravity of the harm (L) multiplied by the probability of its occurrence (P): (B < PL).
Assume that driver D could guard against an accident by driving more slowly, at a cost to him of $8
(the imputed cost of taking longer to reach his destination). Further, assume the gravity of harm to
potential victim V is $10,000 and the probability of the accident occurring is .001. The expected
accident cost is then $10 (10,000 x .001). If a competitive market existed, V would pay D anywhere
from $8 to $10 to drive more slowly-an efficient transaction, since the net gain to society is $2.
However, since a market transaction is not feasible (D and V are assumed to be strangers; thus,
transaction costs are prohibitively high), the driver will not reduce his speed unless the legal system
steps in by holding him liable for damages. Judge Posner views the Hand formula as doing just
that-since the burden (B = $8) is less than the expected harm (PL = $10), the driver would be
negligent. Judge Posner views the negligence formula as allocating liability in such a way as to bring
about the same allocation of resources to safety as would a market. Judge Posner views such legal
rules as reflecting the "implicit economic logic of the common law." R. POSNER, supra note 2, at
229. For a fuller discussion of the example, see id. at 147-51.
30. Judge Posner has stated that he is primarily interested in the positive rather than the nor-
mative economic analysis of law. Posner, supra note 1, at 285. However, his writings clearly argue
for what should be as well as what has been. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 4, at 132 (asserting that
"the task of government is to so arrange things as to simulate the results that the market would have
brought about if a market could have been created").
31. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 12.
32. Id. at 230-33.
33. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
243, 244 (1980).
34. Id. Judge Posner has also equated efficiency (wealth maximization) with justice and moral-
ity. He has stated that "[a] second meaning of justice, perhaps the most common, is effi-
ciency . . . [a]nd with a little reflection, it will come as no surprise that in a world of scarce
resources waste should be regarded as immoral." R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 25. Countering the
criticism that economic analysis disregards the moral dimension of law, Judge Posner asks, "is there
really a fundamental inconsistency between morality and efficiency?"-and answers, "on balance it
would seem that adherence to generally accepted moral principles increases the wealth of society
more than it reduces it." Id. at 238-39.
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mental including judicial action means that the goal of such action is to
bring about the allocation of resources that makes the economic pie as
large as possible, irrespective of the relative size of the slices."' "5
Concerning the second idea-that wealth maximization is the only
social value that courts can do much to promote-Judge Posner has
written:
Courts can do very little to affect the distribution of wealth in a soci-
ety, so it may be sensible for them to concentrate on what they can do,
which is to establish rules that maximize the size of the economic pie,
and let the problem of slicing it up be handled by the legislature with
its much greater taxing and spending powers.
36
Proceeding from the view that wealth maximization should be the
dominant principle of judicial decision-making, Judge Posner advocates
the use of cost-benefit analysis to determine efficiency-promoting legal
rules. 37 In this area, Judge Posner builds upon the theories of Ronald
Coase. 35 Coase suggested that in a market where transactions are
costless, individuals will achieve an efficient allocation of resources
through private bargaining, regardless of the existing legal assignment of
rights and liabilities. 39 However, as Coase noted, where transaction costs
are prohibitively high, individuals will be unable to rearrange rights es-
tablished by law.40
Judge Posner builds upon this idea by suggesting that courts should
use cost-benefit analysis to assign rights and liabilities which reflect the
allocation of resources that would result through private bargaining. 41
Such an initial assignment of rights and liabilities accomplishes two
35. Posner, supra note 4, at 132.
36. Id. Judge Posner illustrates this idea with examples from landlord tenant law. He points to
court enforcement of housing codes and unjust eviction laws as examples of how "the use of liability
rules or other legal sanctions to redistribute income from wealthy to poor is likely to miscarry." R.
POSNER, supra note 2, at 447. He argues that imposing liability on landlords merely results in
increasing landlords' costs, leading to higher rentals and hence to lowering the supply and raising the
price of housing available to the poor. He suggests that public housing and rent subsidies-involving
the taxing and spending power of the legislature-are economically more attractive ways of assisting
the poor. He finds rent subsidies to be the most attractive method of assistance since it preserves a
private market in housing. Id. at 445-48.
37. Posner, supra note 4, at 132.
38. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
39. Id. at 2-8. Coase illustrated this theory by the example of a confectioner operating a loud
machine next door to a doctor who requires quiet. If the confectioner has the right to operate the
machine, but the harm to the doctor is greater than the benefit to the confectioner, the doctor will
likely pay the confectioner to stop using the machine-at a price greater than the benefit but less
than the harm. An efficient allocation of resources results regardless of the initial assignment of the
right to use the machine. For a full treatment of the example with its permutations, see id. at 8-10.
40. Id. at 19.
41. Judge Posner has stated that judges should use "cost-benefit analysis as the criterion of
social choice, where the costs and benefits are measured by the prices that the economic market
places on them, or would place on them if the market could be made to work." Posner, supra note 4,
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things: 1) it eliminates the transaction costs of private bargaining to cir-
cumvent an inefficient legal rule; and 2) it produces an efficient allocation
of resources even where private bargaining is not feasible. 42 In summary,
the role of the court, in Judge Posner's view, is to promote efficiency by
predicting and mimicking a market outcome.
C. Judge Posner's Approach to Statutory Interpretation
As we shall see, Judge Posner's approach to statutory interpretation
is colored by his economic theory of legislation-an eclectic theory
which incorporates the public interest and interest group theorists' views
concerning the content of legislation. 43 Judge Posner proposes catego-
rizing laws along a continuum with the public interest and interest group
categories at opposite ends. He designates the categories on the contin-
uum as: 1) Public Interest, Economically Defined-limiting this cate-
gory to legislation that corrects market failures; 2) Public Interest In
Other Senses-a category for laws that promote a conception of the pub-
lic interest other than efficiency, such as the just distribution of wealth;
3) Public Sentiment-including, for example, laws against pornography;
and 4) Narrow-Interest-Group Legislation-a category of laws that pro-
mote the narrow self-interest of a particular group.44
For Judge Posner, of course, the first category-public interest im-
plicitly limited to maximization of aggregate social wealth-is preferable
to the later categories, which increasingly depart from his economic
ideal.45 The second category appears to represent the traditional law-
yer's view of legislation. Judge Posner purports to see little tension be-
tween the first and second categories, since under both views legislation is
designed to protect the public interest. He views the difference as merely
definitional-a traditional lawyer would define "public interest" in equity
at 132. See also Comment, supra note 12, at 1136-39 (discussing Judge Posner's application of cost-
benefit analysis in several cases).
42. See R. POSNER, supra nlote 2, at 42-45.
43. The public interest theory asserts that the function of legislation is to "increase economic
welfare by correcting 'market failures' such as crime and pollution." R. POSNER, supra note 8, at
262. The interest group theory, on the other hand, views legislation as a "commodity demanded and
supplied much as are other commodities." Id. at 263. Through bargaining with legislators, interest
groups induce the enactment of laws that redistribute wealth in their favor regardless of overall
social welfare. Id.
44. Id. at 265-66.
45. Judge Posner states that "[tihe public interest and interest group theories are theories about
the content of legislation, the former predicting that it will be efficient (always bearing in mind that
efficiency may require some public redistribution of wealth), the latter that it will be amorally redis-
tributive." Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHi.
L. REV. 263, 268 (1982). He also states that "[flrom a normative standpoint, therefore, the interest
group theory is pessimistic concerning the purpose and effects of legislation, while the public interest
theory is optimistic." Id. at 266.
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or utilitarian terms while the economist defines "public interest" in terms
of efficiency. 46 However, Judge Posner considers the interest group legis-
lation of the fourth category as "amorally redistributive" 47 and "system-
atically perverse from a public interest standpoint.
'48
While Judge Posner recognizes that a realistic view of legislation
must incorporate both public interest and interest group statutes, and
that judges are obliged to enforce statutes according to their intent,4 9 he
is apparently uncomfortable at the prospect of judges (including himself)
enforcing "amorally redistributive" and "systematically perverse" inter-
est group statutes. He is willing to construe public interest statutes
broadly to promote the public interest-implicitly defined as effi-
ciencyS°-while he finds that interest group statutes should be narrowly
construed to honor the legislative bargain but avoid giving the interest
group more than what the deal encompassed. 5 '
Moreover, Judge Posner points out that courts are not equipped to
"conduct a social-scientific inquiry" into the legislators' motives or the
interest group pressures to which they may have responded. 52 He finds
that traditional reliance on statutory language and legislative history can
provide some guidance as to how broadly or narrowly a statute should be
construed. 5" But he strongly disagrees with resort to the traditional ca-
nons of construction, finding that they are based on "wholly unrealistic
conceptions of the legislative process."
'54
When the purpose or scope of legislation is uncertain, Judge Posner
proposes a two-part approach as an alternative to the canons of construc-
tion. 55 The first part, which he calls "imaginative reconstruction, ' 56 re-
quires the judge "to put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators
and figure out how they would have wanted the statute applied to the
case before him."' 57 In so doing, the judge should consider not only the
statutory language and legislative history, but also the values and atti-
46. See id. at 265-66.
47. Id. at 268; see also supra note 45.
48. Posner, supra note 45, at 266.
49. See R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 262-72.
50. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
51. See R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 267-86; Comment, supra note 12, at 1129.
52. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 267.
53. Id. at 267-70.
54. Id. at 277. For example, Judge Posner finds that the canon that "remedial statutes are to be
construed broadly" ignores the fact that often a statute is a compromise between groups of legisla-
tors. Id. at 278-79. For a compilation of the canons of construction, see J. SUTHERLAND, STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (C. Sands 4th ed. 1972).
55. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 286.
56. Id. at 287.
57. Id. at 286-87.
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tudes of the period in which the legislation was enacted. 58
The second part comes into play if the attempt at "imaginative re-
construction" fails, perhaps for lack of necessary information.59 In that
case, the judge must interpret the statute in a manner that yields the
"most reasonable result." 60 Judge Posner explains as follows:
[The judge] must decide the case, even though on the basis of consider-
ations that cannot be laid at [the legislature's] door. These might be
considerations of judicial administrability-what interpretation of the
statute will provide greater predictability, require less judicial factfind-
ing, and otherwise reduce the cost and frequency of litigation under
the statute? Or they might be considerations drawn from some
broadly based conception of the public interest. It is always possible,
of course, to refer these considerations back to [the legisla-
ture] .... [but] it is not healthy for a judge to conceal from himself that
he is being creative. 61
Judge Posner does not define "most reasonable result" or "public
interest" as used in the above passage. However, given Judge Posner's
ideology as reflected in his earlier discussion of the categories of legisla-
tion, it would not be surprising to find him interpreting "public interest"
in terms of maximization of social wealth and engaging in efficiency anal-
ysis to determine the "most reasonable result." Indeed, as seen from the
58. Id. at 287. Judge Posner states, "[i]t would be a mistake to ascribe to legislators of the
1930s or the 1960s and early 1970s the skepticism regarding the size of government and the effi-
ciency of regulation that is widespread today. ... The judge's job is not to keep a statute up to date
in the sense of making it reflect contemporary values, but to imagine as best he can how the legisla-
tors who enacted the statute would have wanted it applied to situations they did not foresee." Id.
In his most recent article on statutory interpretation, Judge Posner elaborates on his concept of
imaginative reconstruction. He suggests that the position of a judge is much like the position of a
soldier in battle who receives a garbled radio communication and yet must take some action. Com-
paring the judge to the soldier, Judge Posner states:
[I]n arguing that judges have a duty to interpret, even when the legislative intent is unclear,
I am not arguing for judicial activism. The relationship between a military officer and his
superiors and their doctrines, preferences, and values is, after all, the very model of obedi-
ence and deference. But the relationship does not entail inaction when orders are unclear.
On the contrary, it requires "interpretation" of the most creative kind. And nothing less
will discharge the judicial duty, even for those who believe, as I do, that self-restraint is, at
least in our day, the proper judicial atitude. Creative and willful are not synonyms. You
can be creative in imagining how someone else would have acted knowing what you know
as well as what he knows. That is the creativity of the great statutory judge.
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes And the Constitution, 37
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 200 (1986-87).
59. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 287. Judge Posner notes that the most "scrupulous search for
the legislative will" may turn up nothing. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 820 (1983).
60. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 287. Judge Posner cautions that the legislators' conception of
reasonableness-not the judge's-must prevail. Id. However, he does not explain how the judge is
to know the legislators' conception of reasonableness after the attempt to imaginatively reconstruct
the legislative will has failed.
61. Id. at 289-90.
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actual cases discussed below,62 Judge Posner does interpret statutes on
the basis of efficiency analysis despite his earlier recognition that legisla-
tion often has nonefficiency goals.
63
II. APPLICATION OF THE WEALTH MAXIMIZATION PRINCIPLE IN
STATE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In McMunn v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp.,64 Judge Posner ex-
amined an Indiana statute that invalidates certain indemnity agreements
which shift liability for construction site accidents resulting from
negligence or willful misconduct. 65 McMunn had been injured at a con-
struction site while operating a Bobcat loader which his contractor em-
ployer, Eichleay Corporation, had rented from Hertz for the
performance of a contruction contract with Inland Steel.66 McMunn
sued Hertz for negligent failure to discover a defect in the loader. Hertz
then impleaded Eichleay, pointing to a clause in the rental agreement in
which Eichleay had promised to indemnify Hertz against liability for
personal injuries arising from use of the loader.67 Eichleay defended on
the ground that the clause was void under an Indiana statute which pro-
62. These three cases were chosen for several reasons. First, a survey of Judge Posner's opin-
ions since his appointment to the bench revealed that interpretation of state statutes arises either in
the context of a constitutional or preemption challenge to the statute or as the central issue in a
diversity case or a pendent state claim. The latter category, from which these three cases were
drawn, provided discussions of state statutes presented at length and uncluttered by preemption or
constitutional issues. Second, the cases were interesting because, as will be seen, they present three
different types of application of efficiency analysis: 1) the first case presents an explicit, technical
efficiency analysis; 2) the second case presents a theoretical application of the wealth maximization
principle; and 3) the third case seems to be based on efficiency in terms of judicial administrability
rather than substantive rights. Finally, the cases were interesting because, as discussed in Part III of
this article, they pointed up several different types of objections to Judge Posner's approach.
63. See supra notes 36, 43-44, 49 and accompanying text.
64. 791 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1986).
65. The statute reads as follows:
Sec. 1. All provisions, clauses, covenants, or agreements contained in, collateral to, or
affecting any construction or design contract except those pertaining to highway contracts,
which purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for:
(1) death or bodily injury to persons;
(2) injury to property;
(3) design defects; or
(4) any other loss, damage or expense arising under either (1), (2), or (3);
from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee or the promisee's agents,
servants or independent contractors who are directly responsible to the promisee, are
against public policy and are void and unenforceable.
IND. CODE ANN. § 26-2-5-1 (BURNS SUPP. 1986).
66. McMunn, 791 F.2d at 89.
67. The indemnification clause stated in pertinent part:
Customer [Eichleay] shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless lessor [Hertz], ... against
all loss, liability and expense . . . by reason of bodily injury . . . sustained by any per-
son . . . as a result of the maintenance, ownership, use, operation, storage, erection, dis-
mantling, servicing, or transportation of Equipment, whether such bodily injury . . . [is]
due or claimed to be due to any negligence of lessor [Hertz].
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vides that "agreements contained in, collateral to, or affecting any con-
struction or design contract except those pertaining to highway
contracts, which purport to indemnify the promisee against liability
for ... bodily injury ... [resulting] from the sole negligence or willful
misconduct of the promisee" or his agents are void as against public
policy.
68
The district court held that the equipment lease agreement was not a
contract which "affects construction" 69 as envisioned by the statute, stat-
ing two reasons. First, the court noted that Hertz was not in control of
the construction work nor did it retain control of the loader leased to
Eichleay. 70 Second, the court thought it would be "incongruous" to hold
Hertz liable simply because Eichleay rented the loader for construction
work when Hertz would not be liable if Eichleay rented equipment for a
different purpose.71 Accordingly, the court granted Hertz's motion for
summary judgment and Eichleay appealed.
72
Writing for the court, Judge Posner affirmed the district court's de-
cision, but for very different reasons. Judge Posner began by discussing
the economic function of indemnity agreements. He described the agree-
ment between Hertz and Eichleay as shifting liability to the party who
could have prevented the accident at lower cost, noting "or so at least the
parties may have thought when they signed the indemnity agreement.
'7 3
This statement is consistent with Judge Posner's basic economic principle
that man is a rational self-interest maximizer-i.e., Hertz and Eichleay
would not have made the agreement had it not maximized both parties'
interests.
Judge Posner then stated that "[t]he rub is a statute which, if read
literally, would make the agreement unenforceable. ' 74 Noting that there
was no legislative history or cases interpreting the statute in a similar
setting, Judge Posner first focused on the meaning of the word "affect-
ing." He concluded that this general term was probably used by the leg-
islature in order to plug a potential loophole that would allow parties to a
McMunn v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., No. H81-414, at 2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 9, 1985) (order granting
summary judgment).
68. See supra note 65.
69. McMunn, No. H81-414, at 5. The district court rejected Eichleay's argument that the
rental agreement "affected a construction contract" and instead concluded that the rental agreement
was not a "contract which 'affects construction.' " Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 7. The trial court certified the order for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b) of the
FED. R. Civ. P. McMunn, 791 F.2d at 90.
73. 791 F.2d at 91.
74. Id.
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construction contract to evade the statute by simply making a separate
indemnity agreement. 75 He noted that the use of general language in
order to plug a loophole invites overly broad interpretation. 76 He found
that the term "affecting" was far too general, since "[i]n an interrelated
economy almost everything affects everything else."
' 77
Finding little help from the language of the statute, Judge Posner
then turned to its purpose. An Indiana Court of Appeals case had sug-
gested that the statute may have been intended to protect subcontractors
from broad hold-harmless clauses indemnifying general contractors or to
protect construction workers and the general public by increasing safety
at construction sites.78 Judge Posner expressed doubt that the law would
contribute to construction site safety. He acknowledged the possibility
that if a general contractor can shift the financial burden of liability he
might become more careless. 79 However, he pointed out, there is a disin-
centive to such carelessness: the indemnitee will have to compensate the
indemnitor for imposing a greater risk of liability on the indemnitor just
as a person who has liability insurance may have to pay a higher pre-
mium for his greater carelessness.80 He conceded that "the buffering of
liability" by the indemnity agreement might result in some additional
carelessness, but he claimed that "this would not matter" if the victims
of such extra carelessness received full compensation ex post through
damage awards or ex ante through higher wages.81 Nevertheless, he
75. Id. at 92. Judge Posner stated that "[s]tatutes are drafted in haste and sometimes care-
lessly, by busy legislators concerned with a particular problem but also concerned not to draft their
statute so narrowly that it opens gaping loopholes." Id. at 93.
76. Id. at 92.
77. Id. To illustrate, Judge Posner noted that "[ain indemnity agreement between the manu-
facturer of spark plugs used in a General Motors truck and General Motors could affect a construc-
tion contract in the performance of which the truck was used." Id.
78. Fort Wayne Cablevision v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 443 N.E.2d 863 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983). The court relied upon an article by Bepko, Contracts and Commercial Law, 1975 Survey of
Indiana Law, 9 IND. L. REV. 132, 137 (1975), and on two cases interpreting the Illinois Structural
Work Act. Rutter v. Arlington Park Jockey Club, 510 F.2d 1065 (7th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 61 Ill. 2d 494, 336 N.E.2d 881 (1975).
79. 791 F.2d at 92.
80. Id. It should be noted that Judge Posner's comparison of the indemnity agreement to a
standard liability insurance contract is questionable. A person insured by an insurance company
maintains a continuing relationship with the insurer and thus can expect to pay higher premiums in
the future as a result of his present carelessness. This safety incentive does not exist in the situation
of an indemnity contract between parties who have no expectation of a continuing relationship.
81. Id. Judge Posner overlooked the fact that "full compensation" for loss of life or limb or
other physical injuries is not possible in practice. Moreover, full compensation of the victim would
not change the fact that the indemnity agreement, once entered into, removes the incentive of the
indemnitee to behave carefully. See supra note 80. Nor is it true, as Judge Posner stated, that the
indemnitor and indemnitee are both better off ("otherwise they would not have made the contract,"
791 F.2d at 92). In fact, the indemnitee may behave more carelessly than the indemnitor thought he
would, so that the agreement to indemnify was underpriced in relation to the actual risk transferred.
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concluded,
[T]he compensation may not be adequate, because of lack of informa-
tion or other frictions. So, in sum, it is possible to understand how the
Indiana legislature might have believed that banning indemnity agree-
ments might make construction workers safer; whether its belief was
correct or not is none of our business.
82
That discussion demonstrates that Judge Posner implicitly assumed
that the legislature was concerned only with "efficient safety" rather than
with safety beyond an economically optimal level. The discussion fo-
cuses on the optimal level of safety that would be chosen by the indemni-
tee if he were to take into account all the expected damages resulting
from his negligent or willful activity and assumes that these expected
damages will be reflected in the price the indemnitee pays for the indem-
nity agreement. Judge Posner admits that indemnity contracts might not
always induce an optimal level of safety "because of lack of information
or other frictions"8' 3 and that the Indiana legislature might therefore
"have believed that banning indemnity agreements might make construc-
tion workers [optimally] safer."
'84
Judge Posner then stated, "[i]f this is the policy behind the statute, it
would be but weakly engaged by applying the statute to the present
case."' 85 He noted that the Bobcat loader is used not only for ronhigh-
way construction, as in this case, where indemnity agreements are not
allowed, but also for highway construction and nonconstruction uses al-
together, where indemnity agreements are allowed. Not knowing the
percentage of loaders leased by Hertz for nonhighway construction, he
"suppose[d] it is small."' 86 As such, he found that invalidating Hertz's
indemnity agreements would have a negligible effect on Hertz's safety
incentives since Hertz would "not make appreciably more careful inspec-
tions on the off chance that the loader might be put to a use for which it
would not have indemnity."' 87 He noted, however, that where equipment
is "specialized to nonhighway construction" the supplier's safety incen-
tives might be enhanced by forbidding indemnity contracts.88 Accord-
ingly, Judge Posner held that "the supplier of a nonspecialized good who
has no (other) basis for thinking that the good will be used in construc-
tion is not within the scope of the statute."' 89 In effect, Judge Posner
82. 791 F.2d at 93.
83. See supra text accompanying note 82.
84. Id.






engrafted a scienter requirement onto the statute-requiring either actual
knowledge or reason to know by virtue of the good being "specialized to
nonhighway construction."
As this discussion demonstrates, Judge Posner assumed that the ex-
pected liability in this case was so negligible that it would not be consid-
ered by the parties in pricing the safety costs and would thereby have no
effect on optimal safety. Thus, even if the indemnity agreement were
invalidated by the statute, Hertz would have no incentive to make "ap-
preciably more careful inspections." 90
Judge Posner's reading of the statute can be explained from either a
public interest or interest group perspective. If he considered the statute
to be public interest legislation, he implicitly defined the public interest as
efficient safety and concluded that application of the statute would not
promote that goal. On the other hand, if Judge Posner considered the
statute to be interest group legislation-perhaps intended to protect con-
struction workers by reducing the number of accidents or to protect sub-
contractors from being forced into the role of insurer-he gave the
statute a narrow reading consistent with his approach to interest group
statutes.
McMunn presented an explicit and technical application of
efficiency analysis to interpret a state statute. In Remus v. Amoco Oil
Co. ,91 Judge Posner implicitly applied the wealth maximization principle
on a more theoretical level. Remus involved a Wisconsin statute which
governs certain franchisor-franchisee relationships. 92 Amoco, the
franchisor, had instituted a change in its credit card operations in order
to separate or "unbundle" its cash and credit card sales.93 Prior to the
change, the cost of Amoco's credit card system was reflected in the
wholesale gasoline price charged to dealers. The dealers then sold the
gasoline at a uniform retail price to all customers, cash and credit alike.
Amoco stated that, in effect, cash customers were subsidizing credit card
customers by paying a higher price than they would pay if credit card
costs were not included in the price. 94 As a result, dealers in other
brands of gasoline were able to attract cash customers away from Amoco
dealers by offering a discount on cash purchases. 95
Amoco described the change as involving two components: 1) a re-
90. Id.
91. 794 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 333 (1986).
92. WIs. STAT. §§ 135.01-.07 (1983-84).
93. 794 F.2d at 1239.
94. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 4, Remus v. Amoco Oil Co., 794 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.)
(No. 85-2210), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 333 (1986).
95. 794 F.2d at 1239.
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duction in the wholesale price charged to dealers, with the intention that
dealers would pass on the discount to cash customers; and 2) the imposi-
tion on dealers of a fee for credit card sales, with the intention that the
dealers would pass on the fee to credit card customers.96 Remus, an
Amoco dealer, brought an action against Amoco alleging that Amoco's
purported discount on the wholesale gasoline price was an illusion be-
cause Amoco unilaterally controls the wholesale price. 97 Class certifica-
tion was requested. The dealers claimed that, in fact, they received no
discount and, instead, were simply charged for credit card sales so that
Amoco's revenues would increase at the dealers' expense. 98 They further
contended that the attempt to pass on the credit card fee resulted in ero-
sion of their customer base so that they suffered financial losses. 99 The
dealers alleged that Amoco's action violated the Wisconsin Fair Dealer-
ship Law ("WFDL").' °°
The WFDL forbids a franchisor to "terminate, cancel, fail to renew
or substantially change the competitive circumstances of a dealership
agreement without good cause."'' 1 A franchisor, acting upon good
cause, must give the dealer at least 90 days notice of the intended action
and give the dealer 60 days "to rectify any claimed deficiency."' 0 2 Re-
mus maintained that Amoco's imposition of a fee for credit card sales
substantially changed the competitive circumstances of his dealership
agreement without 90 days notice and without good cause.
0 3
The district court granted Amoco's motion for summary judgment.
The court reasoned that although Amoco's action had "without a doubt,
changed the competitive circumstances of Remus' dealership,"'04 Amoco
had instituted the change for sound business reasons. The court con-
cluded that the "good cause" provision of the WFDL encompassed busi-
ness reasons unrelated to the dealer.10 5
Judge Posner, writing for the court, affirmed the district court deci-
sion, again under a different line of reasoning. He first stated, "we must
try to answer [the questions raised] as best we can from the words of the
statute-for there is no pertinent legislative history, no similarly worded
96. Compare Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5 with 794 F.2d at 1239 (adopting Amoco's de-
scription of the "unbundling" of cash and credit card sales).
97. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7-9.
98. Id. at 17-19.
99. Id. at 17-18.
100. WIS. STAT. §§ 135.01-.07 (1983-84).
101. Id. § 135.03.
102. Id. § 135.04.
103. 794 F.2d at 1240.
104. Remus v. Amoco Oil Co., 611 F. Supp. 885, 887 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
105. Id.
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statute in another state, and no decision by a Wisconsin court interpret-
ing the statute in any respect pertinent to this case."' 0 6 He then de-
scribed at length-and with apparent approval-the motive behind and
effect of Amoco's action. He stated that "[t]he idea behind the un-
bundling was not to change Amoco's revenues (in the short run) but
merely to shift the entire cost of the credit card program onto the shoul-
ders of the credit card customers."'' 0 7 He further stated:
If, as Amoco hoped, the dealer gained more cash customers from the
discount for cash than he lost credit card customers by the surcharge
for credit, both Amoco and the dealer would be better off. Of course a
dealer who for one reason or another was much better at attracting
credit card customers than cash customers might end up worse off. 08
These statements demonstrate Judge Posner's focus on aggregate so-
cial wealth. He adopted Amoco's statement of the facts' 0 9 and implicitly
viewed Amoco's action as wealth maximizing because it would benefit
both parties in the aggregate. He was not concerned with those dealers
who would be hurt by the change.
Judge Posner then turned to the statute. He found that the statute's
definition of "good cause"HO combined with the cure provision-which
gives the dealers 60 days to rectify any claimed deficiency' "I---clearly in-
dicated that "good cause" is confined to fault by the dealer.112 Since
Amoco's change was made purely for business reasons rather than dealer
deficiency, the issue became whether Amoco's action constituted a "sub-
stantial change in competitive circumstances." He concluded that it did
not.
He first found that the phrase "substantial change in competitive
circumstances" might have been intended to encompass actions by the
franchisor that would constitute constructive termination of a dealer-
ship." He then suggested that the statute might go so far as to forbid
actions which adversely affect competition, such as granting too many
106. 794 F.2d at 1238.
107. Id. at 1239.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
110. The statute defines "good cause" to mean either "[flailure by a dealer to comply substan-
tially with essential and reasonable requirements imposed upon him by the grantor .. .which re-
quirements are not discriminatory as compared with requirements imposed on other similarly
situated dealers" or "[b]ad faith by the dealer in carrying out the terms of the dealership." Wis.
STAT. § 135.02(4).
1I1. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
112. 794 F.2d at 1240.
113. Judge Posner described constructive termination as "the franchisor's making the dealer's
competitive circumstances so desperate that the dealer 'voluntarily' gives up the franchise." Id. at
1240.
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dealerships in one locality. However, he "hesitate[d] to conclude" that
the legislature intended the statute to require a franchisor to obtain unan-
imous dealer consent to institute a system-wide nondiscriminatory
change that would benefit the franchisees as a whole.' 14 He stated that
such a law would transform the franchisor-franchisee relationship "much
as a law which" provided that "a company could not alter its prices or
products without" unanimous employee consent." 15 He found that such
a law would allow a "handful of dissenters" to "use the class action de-
vice" to block a change that would benefit the majority of franchisees."l
6
These statements provide further evidence of Judge Posner's focus
on aggregate social wealth. He concluded that the legislature could not
have intended the statute to block an overall wealth maximizing change
in Amoco's business, regardless of whether certain dealers might in fact
have been injured. As such, Amoco's action was not barred by the
statute.
As in McMunn, Judge Posner's interpretation of the statute can be
explained from either a public interest or interest group perspective.
From a public interest standpoint, Judge Posner might view the statute
as prohibiting non-voluntary, non-negotiated changes in order to pro-
mote efficiency. Under this viewpoint, however, it would be inefficient-
and perhaps infeasible because of the transaction costs-to extend the
law so far as to require Amoco to negotiate individual agreements to
institute a system-wide, wealth maximizing change. From an interest
group standpoint, Judge Posner would view the statute as protecting the
interests of the dealers regardless of overall social wealth. Under this
viewpoint, he construed the statute narrowly, considering the legislative
deal to encompass no more than protection against actual or constructive
termination.
Judge Posner also addressed the franchisor-franchisee relationship
in My Pie International, Inc. v. Debould, Inc.117 The dispute in My Pie
involved the application of several provisions of the Illinois Franchise
Disclosure Act ("IFDA").118 First, under the IFDA, a franchisor must
file a disclosure statement with the Illinois Attorney General and provide
prospective franchisees with a copy of the statement not less than seven
days before either execution of a franchise agreement or payment by the
114. Id. at 1241.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 687 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1982).
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§ 701-740 (1981).
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franchisee of "any consideration."' 19 Second, upon application the At-
torney General may grant an exemption from these disclosure require-
ments. 120 Third, a sale of a franchise in violation of the Act is voidable at
the election of the franchisee provided that he notifies the franchisor
within 90 days of learning of the violation. '21 Finally, the right to main-
tain an action for violation of the IFDA expires one year after the discov-
ery of the fact constituting the violation and three years after the act or
transaction constituting the violation.
122
In My Pie, two individuals, Germain and Beadle, formed Dowmont,
Inc. in order to purchase a My Pie pizza franchise. 123 Since My Pie had
not yet registered under the IFDA, 124 Dowmont and My Pie requested
and received an exemption.' 25 The Attorney General's order identified
the exempted transaction simply as the purchase of a franchise in "West-
ment," Illinois. No street address was stated, and the town name, West-
mont, was misspelled. 126 The parties executed the franchise agreement
in May, 1975, reciting in the agreement an address in Westmont. Shortly
thereafter, Dowmont lost its lease at the Westmont address and found
another site in the nearby suburb of Glen Ellyn, Illinois. The parties
then altered the agreement by lining out the Westmont address and sub-
stituting the Glen Ellyn address.'
27
In October, 1977, Germain and Beadle opened a second My Pie res-
taurant under a second corporation, Debould, Inc.' 28 My Pie, having by
this time registered under the Act, gave Germain a disclosure statement.
The cover page stated in bold type the IFDA requirements. Before re-
ceiving the statement, Debould had purchased some supplies from My
Pie, including menus and T-shirts. 29 After Debould received the state-
ment, the parties executed the Debould franchise agreement.13
0
In 1979, Dowmont and Debould ceased making royalty payments.
119. Id. §§ 704, 716. The required content of the disclosure statement is detailed in § 705. The
Attorney General is identified as the administrator of the Act in § 703(20).
120. Id. § 712.
121. Id. § 721(2)(a)-(b).
122. Id. § 722.
123. See 687 F.2d at 926-27 (Eschbach, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Posner recited very few facts in his opinion. Therefore, this article relies for the most part on the
statement of facts in the dissenting opinion. Of necessity, page number citations skip back and forth
between the majority and the dissent.
124. Id. at 923.
125. Id. at 927.
126. Id. at 928.
127. See id. at 928, 933.
128. Id. at 929.
129. Id. at 922.
130. Id. at 929.
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In 1980, both corporations sent notices of rescission to My Pie, claiming
violations of the IFDA.t 3' My Pie brought suit for recovery of royalties
under the franchise agreements. Debould and Dowmont counterclaimed
for royalties already paid under the agreements. 32 At trial, Germain
claimed that the notices of rescission were timely because he did not
learn of the violations until a conference with his attorney in January,
1980.133 The district court awarded royalties to My Pie under the
franchise agreements and denied the counterclaims.
1 34
Writing for the majority, Judge Posner reversed the award of royal-
ties to My Pie and reinstated Debould's counterclaim. 35 He found that
My Pie had violated the IFDA with respect to both corporations. He
viewed Dowmont's Westmont and Glen Ellyn sites as two separate
franchises and found that the Attorney General's exemption order did
not apply to the Glen Ellyn franchise. 136 He viewed Debould's payments
for menus and T-shirts as "consideration" under the Act 37 and thus
found that, although My Pie had provided a disclosure statement to
Debould more than seven days before executing the franchise agreement,
it had failed to provide the statement more than seven days before it
received the consideration for menus and T-shirts.'
38
Having found violations with respect to both franchises, Judge Pos-
ner then considered the issues of rescisson and estoppel. As to the ninety
day limitation period for notice of election to rescind, he noted that fran-
chisees may acquire first knowledge of a violation from their attorneys. 1
39
He then simply stated that My Pie had failed to prove that the defend-
131. Id.
132. Id. at 921.
133. Id. at 923, 935.
134. Id. at 921.
135. Id. at 926. Dowmont had not appealed the denial of its counterclaim.
136. Id. at 923. Judge Posner did not elaborate. He simply stated that the Attorney General's
order was limited to the sale of a franchise in Westmont and that the "Westmont project [fell]
through." Id.
137. Id. at 922. He based his belief, in part, upon the care with which the statute's draftsmen
had defined "franchise fee." He concluded that had the draftsmen intended to confine "considera-
tion" to mean payment of the franchise fee, they would have so stated. Id. at 922-23. Judge Posner
also stressed the fact that the IFDA was intended to protect uninformed franchisees-an objective
that would be undermined "if the franchisor could collect income inthis form from its franchisees
indefinitely, without complying with the statutory disclosure requirement." Id. at 923.
138. Id. at 922.
139. Id. at 923. Judge Posner relied upon Brenkman v. Belmont Mktg., Inc., 87 Ill. App. 3d
1060, 1065, 410 N.E.2d 500, 504 (1980). In Brenkman, the parties had executed a "Management
Agreement" on August 9, 1978. The plaintiff (franchisee) was assured by the defendants that the
agreement was not governed by the IFDA. In November, 1978, plaintiff's attorney advised him that
the agreement was a franchise agreement and that he would be protected by the IFDA. On Decem-
ber 21, 1978 plaintiff rescinded the agreement. The court held that the notice to rescind was timely
since the plaintiff first learned of the violation from his attorney in November, 1978.
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ants had earlier knowledge.140 In response to the contention that
Dowmont was estopped from asserting a violation of the IFDA, Judge
Posner first expressed his view that estoppel should not be an available
defense under the statute. 141 He then found that, in any event, My Pie
was not justified in relying upon Dowmont's exemption application be-
cause he read the exemption order as permitting My Pie only to delay
giving Dowmont the disclosure statement until December 31, 1975, the
expiration date of the order. He stated that My Pie was not justified in
believing that Dowmont would "wait forever" to receive the
statement. 1
42
Finally, Judge Posner turned to Debould's counterclaim and found
that, although the counterclaim, filed in April, 1981, was clearly barred
by the IFDA limitation periods, it was not barred under a different Illi-
nois statute of limitations. This general statute permits a defendant to
plead a time-barred counterclaim so long as the plaintiff's cause of action
was "owned" by the plaintiff before the defendant's claim became time-
barred. 43 Judge Posner stated that since My Pie "owned" its cause of
action before it brought suit on August 18, 1980, Debould's counterclaim
was not barred.'"
Judge Eschbach wrote an elaborate dissent which will be briefly
summarized here. Judge Eschbach concluded that My Pie had not vio-
lated the IFDA. With respect to the Dowmont franchise, Judge Esch-
bach found that Dowmont purchased a single franchise-a license to
operate one My Pie restaurant-and that the parties lawfully executed
the franchise agreement while the exemption order was in effect. 145 Con-
trary to Judge Posner's finding that the exemption did not apply to the
140. 687 F.2d at 923.
141. Judge Posner relied upon caselaw from North Dakota and Minnesota. Peck of Chehalis v.
C.K. of W. Am., Inc., 304 N.W.2d 91, 98-100 (N.D. 1981); Country Kitchen of Mount Vernon, Inc.
v. Country Kitchen of W. Am., Inc., 293 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1980); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v.
Clusiau Sales & Rental, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Minn. 1981). The Peck court held that estoppel
is a defense under the North Dakota franchise disclosure statute. Judge Posner distinguished the
North Dakota statute from the IFDA by noting that the North Dakota statute authorizes an action
for rescission without using the word "voidable" while the IFDA authorizes an action for rescission
using the words "voidable at the election of the franchisee." See My Pie, 687 F.2d at 924; see also
infra note 148 and accompanying text. The Country Kitchen and Chase Manhattan Bank courts did
not address the issue of estoppel.
142. Id. at 925.
143. The statute provides in pertinent part:
§ 13-207. Counterclaim or set-off. A defendant may plead a set-off or counterclaim barred
by the statute of limitation, while held and owned by him or her, to any action, the cause of
which was owned by the plaintiff or person under whom he or she claims, before such set-
off or counterclaim was so barred, and not otherwise.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 17 (1981)(now ch. 110, § 13-207 (1983)).
144. 687 F.2d at 925. Judge Posner did not elaborate.
145. 687 F.2d at 931 (Eschbach, J., dissenting).
330
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"Glen Ellyn franchise," Judge Eschbach pointed out that the order re-
ferred to "Westment" (misspelled) simply for the purpose of general
identification of the transaction-not for identification of a specific loca-
tion. He noted that under Judge Posner's reasoning, if Dowmont had
found a different location in Westmont (or perhaps "Westment") the ex-
emption order presumably would have been effective. 146 With respect to
the Debould franchise, Judge Eschbach disagreed that the payment of
two invoices for menus and T-shirts was "consideration" under the
IFDA. Noting that anyone can buy My Pie T-shirts, he reasoned that
the disclosure statement is designed to protect prospective franchisees
before they contractually commit themselves to a franchise agreement by
making an advance payment for the franchise-not to protect prospec-
tive T-shirt purchasers.
147
Even if the change of address for the Dowmont franchise could be
construed as a violation, Judge Eschbach strongly disagreed with Judge
Posner's view that estoppel is not a defense under the IFDA. 148 He
found that My Pie was justified in believing it would never have to pro-
vide a disclosure statement and that Dowmont was estopped from assert-
ing a "hypertechnical violation."' 149 He contended that Judge Posner's
reading of the exemption order as merely delaying the time for disclosure
represented a "basic misunderstanding of the purpose of the disclosure
statement." 150 Noting that the purpose of the IFDA is to protect pro-
spective franchisees, he found that Judge Posner's interpretation made
little sense, since once the franchise agreement is executed there is no
longer a prospective franchisee to be protected.151
The next issue was whether the franchisees gave timely notice of
their election to rescind. Judge Eschbach characterized Germain's claim
of ignorance as "self-serving,"' 52 and pointed out that Beadle testified
that at the time of the exemption request Germain had informed him
that the exemption was required due to the disclosure requirement of the
IFDA.153 Judge Eschbach found that "there is no question that
146. Id. at 932.
147. Id. at 936.
148. Id. at 933-34. Judge Eschbach stated, "[t]he distinction which the majority points to in
support of its uncertainty on this question-a purported distinction between authorizing an action
for rescission and making a contract voidable---escapes me. Under Illinois law, and the common law
for that matter, a voidable contract is voided through rescission." Id. at 933. See supra note 141 and
accompanying text.
149. 687 F.2d at 934.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 932.
152. Id. at 935.
153. Id. at 927.
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Germain (not to mention Beadle, whom the majority fail[ed] to mention)
knew the legal rule, and knew he had not received a timely disclosure
statement, at least as early as 1977, and probably as early as 1975."
154
Since the district court had not addressed the credibility of Germain's
claim, he contended that at the very least the case should have been re-
manded for factual findings on this issue. 155
The final issue was whether Debould's counterclaim was time-
barred. Initially, Judge Eschbach argued that the general statute of limi-
tations could not be used to supplant a fixed limitation expressed in the
statute that creates the action. 156 However, he found that even if applica-
tion of the general statute was appropriate, Judge Posner misapplied it.
He explained that under the IFDA, Debould's action expired one year
after it learned of the fact constituting the violation. 157 According to
Judge Eschbach, Debould knew that it had not received a disclosure
statement at the time it paid the invoices for menus and T-shirts in Octo-
ber, 1977. Therefore, the counterclaim was barred in October, 1978. My
Pie's action for breach of the franchise agreement did not accrue until
March, 1979 when Debould defaulted on its royalty payments. Thus,
Debould did not "own" its counterclaim within the period of time that
My Pie "owned" its cause of action.
158
Judge Posner's opinion in My Pie would seem to be difficult to rec-
oncile with his economic principles. If the statute is viewed in light of
Judge Posner's second category of legislation-Public Interest In Other
Senses159-as requiring reasonable disclosure, there seems to have been
reasonable disclosure. My Pie apparently acted in good faith, and there
were no allegations of fraud. If the statute is viewed as interest group
legislation, Judge Posner clearly did not interpret the statute narrowly,
but quite broadly to protect the franchisees. And if the statute is viewed
in light of Judge Posner's first category of efficiency-promoting laws, the
decision also seems puzzling. Judge Posner has written, "[e]conomic
analysis reveals no grounds other than fraud, incapacity, and du-
ress ... for allowing a party to repudiate the bargain that he made in
entering into [a] contract.'16  Yet, in My Pie, he seemed to jump
through hoops to allow Dowmont and Debould to rescind their franchise
154. Id. at 935.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 936-37.
157. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
158. 687 F.2d at 937-38.
159. See supra text accompanying note 44.
160. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 104.
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agreements, years after they were made, on the basis of purely technical
violations of the IFDA.
Upon closer examination, however, it is suggested that Judge Pos-
ner's puzzling resolution may, indeed, be explained in terms of economic
considerations. Recall the earlier discussion of Judge Posner's two ratio-
nales to be considered in reaching the "most reasonable result": consid-
erations of the public interest and considerations of judicial
administrability.161 Focusing upon considerations of the public interest
defined in terms of efficiency, Judge Posner would not ordinarily be in
favor of information at any cost. For example, in discussing fraud, he
has written that " [t]he question of liability for nondisclosure should turn
on which of the parties to the transaction, seller or consumer, can pro-
duce or obtain information at lower cost.' 62 And, in fact, he finds many
disclosure and information-related laws to be inefficient.' 63 In My Pie,
however, Judge Posner's hands were tied in terms of being able to inter-
pret the statute to affect the disclosure requirements. My Pie did not
present substantive interpretation questions; 164 the statute clearly ap-
plied. Rather, the case turned upon fact questions and equity principles.
Since the statute clearly requires disclosure, it would seem that
Judge Posner turned instead to considerations of judicial adminis-
trability-i.e., what is the most efficient way to enforce the disclosure
requirement. In discussing the "most reasonable result" portion of his
approach to interpretation, Judge Posner has written, "[w]hat if, for ex-
ample[,] the statute would be much cheaper to administer if it were inter-
preted as embracing the claim made by this party? I consider this a
proper reason for 'interpreting' the legislation to cover the claim.' 65 In
My Pie, a rule that took in all equitable considerations and allowed the
parties some flexibility-such as lining out an address or collecting pay-
ment for menus and T-shirts-would create more litigation and judicial
factfinding and thus would be more costly to administer. From an effi-
ciency standpoint, it is cheaper to administer a strict rule that will reduce
litigation.166 Moreover, compliance with a strict rule will not be signifi-
161. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
162. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 99.
163. See id. at 346-50 (discussing the Federal Trade Commission disclosure requirements), 420-
24 (discussing securities regulations), 392-93 (discussing insider trading).
164. The court did, however, interpret the word "consideration." See supra note 137 and ac-
companying text.
165. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 290.
166. One might suggest that if franchisees are permitted to rescind a contract on the basis of
technicalities, the result would be more litigation. The response is that presumably franchisors will
be aware of and guard against the potential exposure so that the net result is decreased litigation.
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cantly more costly ahead of time for future franchisors once they know
such compliance is required.
Focusing upon judicial administrability, the strict rule in My Pie can
also be reconciled with Judge Posner's categories of legislation. On the
one hand, a strict rule does not offend the efficiency concept of the public
interest. As mentioned above, since the statute already requires disclo-
sure, strict compliance will not impose significantly greater costs upon
the franchisor. On the other hand, in this case there would seem to be no
harm in giving a broad reading to an interest group statute. The fran-
chisees are already entitled to disclosure; assuming that future
franchisors heed the strict rule, franchisees will receive no greater benefit
than that to which they are already entitled.
III. OBJECTIONS TO JUDGE POSNER'S APPROACH
The previous section outlined both Judge Posner's opinions and the
economic factors expressed in or suggested by the decisions. This section
will present two major criticisms and several associated objections to
Judge Posner's approach. The first major criticism is that the use of effi-
ciency analysis as the basis for interpreting statutes violates the judicial
role by usurping the legislative function. As Judge Posner himself ad-
mits, the legislature often has goals other than economic efficiency in
mind and the judge's role is to apply the statute in accordance with the
legislature's goals. 167 A corollary to this criticism is that Judge Posner's
approach is also potentially violative of federalism concerns, since the
role of a federal judge is to apply state law as would the state's highest
court. Thus, in the context of federal diversity jurisdiction, Judge Pos-
ner's approach imputes efficiency concerns not only to the state legisla-
ture but also to the state judiciary.
The second major criticism is that efficiency analysis itself provides
a flawed basis for decision-making. First, the analysis requires data that
is simply not available to judges, and thus the efficiency approach is nec-
essarily speculative and capable of great manipulation. Second, because
the analysis is complex and depends on numerous variables that are often
speculatively supplied, it is easily misapplied, even by a master such as
Judge Posner himself. Finally, the complexity of efficiency analysis, es-
pecially when it is misapplied or provides a hidden basis for arguments
that are not clearly articulated, makes the rationale for his opinions in-
comprehensible to nonexpert judges, practitioners and students. Thus,
his approach fails to provide certainty and guidance in law-making.
167. See supra notes 36, 43-44, 49 and accompanying text.
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The three cases discussed in Part II of this article point up several
particular objections associated with the two major criticisms presented
above. These are Judge Posner's use of unsupported assumptions, his
treatment of statutes as if he were writing on a blank slate, and his focus
on efficient rule formulation in disregard of equitable considerations.
While these objections apply-to a greater or lesser degree-to each of
the opinions, each case will be analyzed in light of the objection that is
most graphically illustrated.
A. The Assumption Approach
As discussed in Part I of this article, Judge Posner calls the first part
of his approach to statutory interpretation "imaginative reconstruc-
tion."1 68 He further admits that the approach is "easy to ridicule" by
saying that a judge does not have the requisite imagination and will sim-
ply assume the legislators thought like himself. 69 Judge Posner counters
this potential criticism by noting that a conscientious judge will be alert
to the language, purpose, background, structure and legislative history of
the statute, as well as the values and attitudes of the period in which the
legislation was enacted.
In McMunn,170 Judge Posner made a series of assumptions through
"imaginative interpretation"' 7' to determine that Hertz's indemnity
agreement was not one "affecting" a construction contract as contem-
plated by the statute. The first assumption 72 was that the use of the
general term "affecting" must have been the result of busy and careless
legislators attempting to plug a loophole that would allow parties to a
construction contract to evade the statute by making a separate indem-
nity contract. 73 However, the legislators seem to have covered that
loophole by use of the term "collateral."' 174 Perhaps the legislators used
the words "contained in, collateral to or affecting" in order to create
three classes of agreements: 1) those contained in the construction con-
tract; 2) separate agreements made between the original parties to the
construction contract; and 3) agreements involving an original party and
168. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
169. Posner, supra note 59, at 817; see also R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 287.
170. 791 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1986). This case is discussed supra text accompanying notes 64-90.
171. 791 F.2d at 93. Judge Posner stated, "it is the task of courts by imaginative interpretation
to keep the statute within reasonable bounds, as we have tried to do." Id.
172. For analytical purposes, the assumptions are presented in a slightly different sequence than
in both the written opinion and Part II of this article.
173. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
174. In the law of contracts, the term "collateral" is commonly used to denote a separate agree-
ment made between the parties to a contract. See, e.g., 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 638 (3d ed. 1961) (discussion of the parol evidence rule).
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some third party that directly affect the performance of the construction
contract. By simply assuming that the term "affecting" was surplusage,
Judge Posner side-stepped the major interpretive question in the case-
i.e., what classes of cases did the legislators intend the statute to govern?
Instead, the assumption cleared the way for employing efficiency analysis
to decide the case.
The second assumption was that the legislature's purpose was only
efficient safety rather than some higher level of safety. This assumption
stems solely from Judge Posner's economic predisposition rather than
from any available indicia of the legislature's intent.
The third assumption was that the indemnity agreement shifted lia-
bility to the party who could have prevented the accident at lower cost.
There is nothing in the facts to indicate that this was the case. The
loader was allegedly defective. The rental agreement indicated that
Hertz was to deliver the loader to the construction site on the day before
the accident. 175 The facts do not indicate whether-and, if so, at what
cost-Eichleay would have been able to discover the defect. One might
assume that Hertz, in the course of regular inspections of its equipment,
could discover potential defects at lower cost than Eichleay, who appar-
ently merely accepted delivery of the loader and would not, in the ordi-
nary course of business, have mechanics on hand to make inspections.
Moreover, the rental agreement was a printed form contract1 76 and the
parties stipulated that Hertz did not know the intended use of the
loader. 177 These facts indicate that the parties had not deliberated over
who could prevent the accident at a lower cost.
Judge Posner next assumed that the percentage of loaders leased by
Hertz for nonhighway construction use was small. This empirical as-
sumption appears to be purely conjectural. The parties had stipulated
that "Bobcat loaders are commonly used in the performance of construc-
tion work, but are also commonly used for work unrelated to construc-
tion." 178  If one assumes the split between construction and
nonconstruction use to be fifty-fifty, and further assumes the split be-
tween highway and nonhighway construction use to be fifty-fifty, the re-
sult is twenty-five percent-not a "small" percentage. One might also
assume this figure to be larger yet, since the Bobcat loader is a small,
four-wheel, rubber tire utility vehicle that might be more commonly used
175. See Third-Party Defendant-Appellant's Brief and Appendix, Appendix at 2 and Exhibit A
(No. 85-2502).
176. See id.
177. 791 F.2d at 91.
178. See supra note 175, Appendix at 2.
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in small nonhighway construction projects than large highway construc-
tion projects. But all of this is equally pure conjecture.
Based upon the assumption that the percentage of loaders used for
nonhighway construction was small, Judge Posner then assumed that
there was a negligible likelihood that Hertz would make more careful
inspections on the "off chance" that a loader would be used for nonhigh-
way construction.1 79 Again, this assumption is based upon conjecture.
Perhaps Hertz would make more careful inspections if it were subject to
liability on even a small percentage of its rental agreements. In fact, the
number of potential accidents is not dispositive; the amount of a potential
judgment-especially with the greater risk present in the construction
setting-would seem to be the more determinative factor. More impor-
tant, however, Judge Posner's characterization of the question in terms
of raising the level of precaution-i.e., that Hertz would "not make ap-
preciably more careful inspections"I1 °0-seems to approach the problem
as if Hertz were subject to liability for nonconstruction accidents and
highway construction accidents so that the potential liability from a
small number of nonhighway construction accidents would not add to its
already existing safety incentives. In fact, Hertz's standard indemnity
contract is valid for nonconstruction accidents and highway construction
accidents, so that its only incentive for safety (other than reputation)
would come from nonhighway construction accidents for which the in-
demnity agreement is void under the statute.
Thus, Judge Posner's argument is not only built on speculative as-
sumptions, but also is a flawed application of efficiency analysis. More-
over, paradoxically, the argument allows indemnification in the one and
only category for which the legislature specifically sought to prohibit in-
demnification: the nonhighway construction category. The argument, if
fully applied, would wipe out the entire statute, not just the "affecting"
class of cases.
Finally, Judge Posner assumed that safety incentives would be ap-
preciably impacted only if there were actual knowledge or reason to
know of the intended equipment use in a particular case. It would seem,
however, that a supplier would not wait for actual knowledge of each
intended use before inspecting his equipment, but rather would inspect
the equipment beforehand based on the aggregate of expected uses, in-
cluding especially the nonindemnifiable nonhighway construction uses.
Both the reasoning and the holding in McMunn are disturbing. The
179. 791 F.2d at 93.
180. Id.
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use of efficiency analysis seems particularly inappropriate in this case.
Judge Posner's assumption that the contract shifted liability to the party
who could take precautions more cheaply rests upon the prior assump-
tion that, as rational (and presumptively fully informed) self-interest
maximizers, the parties otherwise would not have made the contract-a
basic assumption of economic analysis of law. 181 Whether the legislators
would make this theoretical assumption, either in general or in the case
at bar, is questionable. However, even if the legislators theoretically
agreed with this view of human behavior, they clearly rejected efficiency
concerns in adopting a law which invalidates indemnity agreements
which are voluntarily entered into, and which are, by Judge Posner's pre-
sumption, efficient. Moreover, this broad "voluntary agreements are effi-
cient" rationale, like the narrower "leases for nonhighway construction
uses are too rare to affect safety incentives" rationale discussed above,
would undermine the entire statute, not just the "affecting" class of cases.
If indemnity agreements are viewed as a device for achieving economi-
cally optimal safety, the legislature clearly did not have economically op-
timal safety in mind.
Imputing efficiency concerns to the legislators was not only incor-
rect, but also potentially violative of federalism concerns. It is well set-
tled that the duty of a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction is to
determine state law as it believes the state's highest court would. Where
the state supreme court has not spoken, the federal court must look for
other indicia of state law. However, the federal court is not free to
choose the rule it would adopt for itself.182 Under our federal system, if
the State of Indiana chooses to adopt an inefficient law which interferes
with voluntary transactions in order to pursue safety concerns, it may do
so. Considering that efficiency appears to be one concern that the Indi-
ana legislature clearly rejected in this case, it seems highly inappropriate
to use an efficiency analysis to determine the scope of the statute.
From an actual (rather than economically optimal) safety stand-
point, the connection between Hertz's indemnity agreement and
Eichleay's construction contract was not nearly as attenuated as Judge
Posner suggested. Hertz was a direct supplier of equipment used on a
construction site. The indemnity agreement was between the supplier
and the contractor. Contrary to Judge Posner's analogy, Hertz's role is
not comparable to that of a "manufacturer of spark plugs" who supplies
181. See supra text accompanying notes 22 and 73.
182. See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4507 (1982).
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General Motors who in turn manufactures trucks that may be used at a
construction site. '
83
Finally, from a practical standpoint, the scienter requirement that
Judge Posner engrafted onto the statute creates uncertainty for business
people and practitioners. It is now unclear which equipment suppliers
will be within the scope of the statute. What goods are "specialized" to
nonhighway construction? Does this mean the supplier of scaffolding
will lose indemnification while the supplier of a bulldozer will retain in-
demnification even though both goods are used in the same building con-
struction? This result, at least, could hardly have been intended by the
legislature.
B. The Tabula Rasa Approach
In Remus,184 Judge Posner asserted that there was "no pertinent
legislative history, . . . and no decision by a Wisconsin court interpret-
ing the [Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law] in any respect pertinent" to the
case. 185 As such, he proceeded to interpret both the legislative purpose
and intent by relying solely upon the words in the substantive provisions
of the statute. Apparently, the key word in Judge Posner's statement is
"pertinent." As discussed below, not only did the legislators expressly
state the purpose of the statute, but both the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and the Seventh Circuit had previously addressed the purpose, intent,
and legislative history of the WFDL.
The stated purpose of the WFDL is, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) This chapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying remedial purposes and policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this chapter are:
(a) To promote the compelling interest of the public infair busi-
ness relations between dealers and grantors, and in the continua-
tion of dealerships on a fair basis;
(b) To protect dealers against unfair treatment by grantors, who
inherently have superior economic power and superior bargaining
power in the negotiation of dealerships;
(c) To provide dealers with rights and remedies in addition to
those existing by contract or common law.'
86
The most frequently litigated issue under the WFDL has been
whether a particular business relationship falls within the meaning of a
"dealership." In determining this issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
183. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
184. 794 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1986). This case is discussed supra text accompanying notes 91-
116.
185. 794 F.2d at 1238.
186. WIs. STAT. § 135.025 (1983-84) (emphasis added).
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has twice stated that the legislature "acted to protect 'dealers' from
'grantors' rather zealously, particularly with respect to the continuation
of 'dealerships.' If a relationship is a dealership, the protections afforded
the dealer are to be construed and applied liberally to the dealer."187 In
one case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the WFDL was en-
acted "for the protection of the interests of the dealer, whose economic
livelihood may be imperiled by the dealership grantor, whatever its
size." 188 In another case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted a press
release from the office of Wisconsin Governor Patrick Lucey which ac-
companied the introduction of the assembly bill in order to explain the
purpose of the WFDL. The release stated:
This bill is intended to protect the thousands of small businessmen in
Wisconsin who are franchisees. These businessmen operate filling sta-
tions, building materials and supply houses, lumber yards, sports
equipment stores, motels, hotels and restaurant chains. They sell farm
implements, clothing, furniture, and many other types of goods under
a franchise system. The intent in this legislation is toprotect these Wis-
consin businessmen from pressure from a franchisor which is not in their
best interests. 189
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit later quoted from this passage in
Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Services, Inc. v. Walgreen Co. 190 in order
to establish the legislature's intent. In Kealey, the court held that the
WFDL prohibited Walgreen from terminating all of its pharmacy dealers
in Wisconsin and replacing them with company owned stores. The court
relied, in part, upon the legislative history of the law. In the course of
enacting the WFDL, the legislature had considered but rejected an
amendment which would have provided exceptions from the WFDL for
actions taken by a franchisor to:
(a) vertically integrate;
(b) alter or adjust its marketing technique, scheme or plan;
(c) withdraw from a geographic marketing area; or
(d) dispose of through sale or lease, any parcel of real estate occupied
by a dealer upon the expiration of the dealer's lease for the parcel as
long as the parcel of real estate ceases to be the site of a branded outlet
187. Foerster, Inc. v. Atlas Metal Parts Co., 105 Wis. 2d 17, 32, 313 N.W. 2d 60, 67 (1981)
(quoting H. Phillips Co. v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 483 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (W.D. Wis.
1980)); Kania v. Airborne Freight Corp., 99 Wis. 2d 746, 775, 300 N.W.2d 63, 76 (1981) (also
quoting Phillips) (emphasis added).
188. Rossow Oil Co. v. Heiman, 72 Wis. 2d 696, 702, 242 N.W.2d 176, 180 (1976) (emphasis
added). In this case the issue was whether the dealership agreement came into existence before or
after enactment of the WFDL rather than whether the business arrangement was a "dealership."
189. Foerster, Inc. v. Atlas Metal Parts Co., 105 Wis. 2d 17, 24, 313 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1981)
(emphasis added).
190. 761 F.2d 345, 349 (7th Cir. 1985).
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of the grantor. 191
The court relied upon the legislature's refusal to adopt an exception for
withdrawal from a geographic market as indicating that Walgreen's sys-
tem-wide terminations should be prohibited. 192 Analogous reliance in
Remus could be placed on the legislature's refusal to adopt an exception
for altering or adjusting a marketing technique, scheme or plan (subdivi-
sion (b) of the proposed exceptions). Indeed, the Remus case seems quite
similar to the Kealey case: both involved system-wide restructurings to
improve efficiency (maximize aggregate wealth) at the expense of individ-
ual dealers.
While the above history does not directly address the question of
how far the statute was intended to extend, it clearly demonstrates that
the legislature's focus was on dealer protection and fairness rather than
efficiency. While some of the above language relates to protection from
termination, other passages indicate much broader protection.
Although Judge Posner's writings on statutory interpretation em-
phasize the use of legislative history-as well as consideration of the val-
ues and attitudes of the period in which the statute was enacted193 -he
declined to consider the above indicators of legislative intent and pur-
pose.1 94 He presumed that the "statute's main purpose is to give dealers
a kind of tenure,"195 analogized the position of the franchisee to that of
an employee,196 and focused instead on the aggregate wealth effect of
Amoco's action.
Had Judge Posner given greater weight to both the dealer protection
purpose of the statute and the dealer's position as a self-employed small
businessman, he might have scrutinized the alleged harmful impact on
the dealers more carefully. Remus and his class alleged that they re-
ceived no discount and were simply charged for credit card sales so that
Amoco's revenues were increased at their expense. Judge Posner did not
address these claims. He treated the question of whether Amoco's ac-
tions "substantially change[d] the competitive circumstances of the deal-
ership" as one of interpretation rather than of fact. Finding that
Amoco's change was, in theory, economically sound, he held that the
legislature could not have intended to prohibit it.
191. The proposed amendment appears in Kealey, 539 F. Supp. 1357, 1366 (W.D. Wis. 1982),
aff'd, 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985).
192. 761 F.2d at 350.
193. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
194. Judge Posner did distinguish Kealey on its facts. However, he did not mention the legisla-
tive history on which Kealey relied. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
195. Remus, 794 F.2d at 1240.
196. Id. at 1241.
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As in McMunn, Judge Posner's reasoning in Remus raises judicial
role and federalism concerns. If the State of Wisconsin chooses to pro-
tect its small businessmen at the expense of efficiency, it may do so. It
would seem, then, that a determination of whether the dealers in Remus
were, in fact, financially harmed by Amoco's action was of prime impor-
tance. As discussed in Part II, the district court had found "without a
doubt" that Amoco's action had changed the competitive circumstances
of Remus' dealership. 197 Given the procedural posture of the case (ap-
peal from the granting of summary judgement to Amoco), a remand for a
factual determination of the financial impact on the dealers was
warranted.
C. The Ex Ante Approach
Professor Laurence Tribe, in criticizing the application of economic
analysis to legal problems, described the "ex ante approach" as follows:
[S]ophisticated judges who "appreciate" the economic system are pul-
led toward an ex ante approach, in which a court is interested less in
doing justice in the case at hand than in creating sound rules to govern
the behavior of the world at large....
... That is, if courts seek to do justice among the parties actu-
ally before them by merely slicing up the pie fairly, they must forfeit
the opportunity to expand the pie as a whole by formulating an appro-
priate forward-looking and general legal rule.
198
Writing as an economist, Judge Posner endorses the ex ante ap-
proach, stating that "justice and fairness [are] not economic terms" and
that an economist is not interested in the financial consequences of a past
accident. 199 "To the economist, the accident is a closed chapter. The




It is suggested that Judge Posner's opinion in My Pie20 1 reflects the
economist's ex ante approach to dispute resolution. From an equity
standpoint, the wrongness of the decision is startling. My Pie acted in
good faith. It had informed Dowmont and Debould of the IFDA re-
quirements, had requested and received an exemption for the Dowmont
franchise, and had provided Debould with a disclosure statement before
executing the second franchise agreement. As Judge Eschbach con-
197. See supra text accompanying note 104.
198. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV.
592, 593 (1985).
199. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 22.
200. Id.
201. 687 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1982). This case is discussed supra text accompanying notes 117-66.
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cluded in his dissent, My Pie committed no violations of the IFDA or, at
the very most, a "hypertechnical violation" on the Dowmont franchise
which Dowmont should have been estopped from asserting. 20 2 With re-
spect to the Dowmont franchise, applying for a second exemption would
have been wiser (in retrospect) than lining out the Westmont address and
substituting the Glen Ellyn address. With respect to the Debould
franchise, My Pie merely collected payments for menus and T-shirts al-
ready sold. The payments in no way obligated Debould to purchase a
franchise. There were no allegations of fraud. Moreover, even if My
Pie's actions could be construed as minor violations, Dowmont and
Debould failed to give notice of their election to rescind for three and
one-half years and two and one-half years respectively (despite the ninety
day limitation period for election) and failed to file an action until long
after the IFDA statute of limitations had run. Not only was My Pie
denied recovery of back royalties, but Debould's counterclaim for royal-
ties already paid was reinstated on the basis of debatable, technical viola-
tions and Germain's highly suspect claim of ignorance, 20 3 the credibility
of which had not been addressed by the district court.
As discussed in Part II, the harsh result in My Pie seems explaina-
ble, especially given Judge Posner's ideology as demonstrated in his other
decisions and writings, only by viewing the case as one in which Judge
Posner focused upon efficient rule formulation vis-a-vis judicial adminis-
trability. 2°4 Judge Posner was unconcerned with the injustice of possibly
forcing My Pie to return years of back royalties when he reinstated the
counterclaim. As a forward-looking legal precedent, however, the deci-
sion encourages future franchisors to strictly comply with the require-
ments of the IFDA so that the court docket will be reduced.
As mentioned above, Judge Posner suggests that a judge should try
to figure out how the legislators would have wanted the statute applied to
the case at bar. It is doubtful that the legislators would have wanted the
IFDA to be applied so strictly as to ignore all equitable considerations.
They included a ninety-day limitation period for rescission, one and three
year limitation periods for bringing an action under the statute, and a
202. See supra text accompanying notes 145-51.
203. Germain claimed he did not learn of the violations until January, 1980, at a conference with
his new attorney. However, he testified that he had read and signed a copy of the draft exemption
request letter and that he was present when the final document was signed. 687 F.2d at 927 (Esch-
bach, J., dissenting). Further, Beadle testified that Germain had informed him that the exemption
was required due to the disclosure requirement of the IFDA. Id. Moreover, even if Germain and
Beadle somehow did not know of the requirements at the time the Dowmont franchise agreement
was executed, the disclosure statement for the Debould franchise stated on the cover in bold type the
requirements of the IFDA. Id. at 929.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
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provision to allow exemptions from the requirements for disclosure. By
ignoring what appears to be the intended limiting effect of these provi-
sions, Judge Posner seems to have attempted to make My Pie simply an
example for future franchisors.
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CONCLUSION
This article has presented several objections to the application of
economic analysis to statutory interpretation. Methodologically, Judge
Posner's approach is objectionable for his use of unsupported empirical
assumptions and theoretical assumptions that cannot be imputed to the
legislators, his disregard of available indicators of legislative intent, and
his focus upon efficient rule formulation in disregard of equitable consid-
erations. Philosophically, Judge Posner's approach is objectionable as
usurpative of the legislative function and, thus, violative of the judicial
role and potentially violative of federalism concerns.
PAULA M. TAFFE
205. See Franchisors Should Strictly Heed State Disclosure Laws, 1983 PREVENTIVE L. REP. 71,
72 (advising attorneys that "strict compliance with [disclosure] laws appears to be necessary under
My Pie regardless of the equities involved").
